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Introduction
There are several motives for negotiating regional trade agreements (RTAs) 1 and not all of them are based on economic considerations (WTO, 2011) . However, it seems straightforward that when signing an RTA, countries aim at reducing trade barriers among themselves. Preambles of trade agreements generally emphasize the promotion of trade and the removal of trade distortions as objectives that motivate the disciplines of the agreement. We should therefore expect RTAs to decrease trade costs between their parties, and empirical work in the case of goods tends to support this idea (see for example Pomfret and Sourdin, 2009; Chauffour and Maur, 2011 and WTO, 2011for a review).
Regional trade agreements covering services have not proliferated as much as those covering goods.
There were 88 agreements notified to WTO under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the end of August 2011, as compared to 213 notified under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While fewer RTAs deal with services, the share of world trade covered by these agreements is higher for services than for goods. As will be discussed in the paper, one should not interpret the fact that two countries have an RTA in services as a sign of "preferential"
trade. In the case of goods, only 16 percent of world trade can be regarded as preferential, i.e. actually benefitting from a lower tariff in the context of the RTA (WTO, 2011) . The same can be expected from services as GATS-plus commitments are legal bindings that do not guarantee preferential treatment.
Recently signed RTAs are generally characterized as "deep integration" because they go beyond traditional market access concerns and deal with a broad range of trade-related issues. They also deal more with "behind-the-border" policies and address domestic regulations that have an impact on trade. Services is somehow a "borderline" area. Part of services commitments in RTAs is stricly speaking about "market access". But as barriers to trade in services are mainly "behind-the-border", 1 A note on terminology: we refer to "regional trade agreements" rather than "preferential trade agreements" or "free trade agreements", as the expression seems to us more neutral. Of course, it could be pointed out that most agreements are "bilateral" rather than "regional". But trade agreements in the case of services are not always "preferential" and never lead to "free trade". Switching to PTAs or FTAs does not improve the accuracy of the terminology. services also illustrate the "deep integration" disciplines in recent RTAs.
Moreover, there is a consensus in the literature on the fact that services RTAs are WTO-plus.
Several studies have compared market access and national treatment commitments in GATS and commitments in RTAs and unequivocally found that the latter cover a much higher number of subsectors than the former (Marchetti and Roy, 2008; Fink and Molinuevo, 2008; Miroudot et al., 2010) 2 . But commitments are legal bindings and do not always correspond to the actual trade regime, which might be more liberal (or less liberal). The extent to which services RTAs have led to trade liberalisation and actually reduced trade costs becomes an empirical question.
Building on Miroudot et al. (2012) where we have developed theory-consistent estimates of bilateral trade costs for a large number of countries over the period 1999-2009 (and which we extend to 2011 here), this chapter further analyses the relationship between regional integration and the evolution of trade costs in services industries. The next section explains how we measure trade costs in services and describes the database of services commitments in RTAs that we use in the analysis.
Section 3 provides stylised facts on trade costs within and outside regional trade agreements and Section 4 discusses why services RTAs seem to have a limited impact on trade costs in services.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical data on trade costs and services trade liberalisation at the regional level 2.1 Bilateral trade costs in services: a database covering 61 countries over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] Starting from the standard, theory-consistent gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , Novy (2011) 
Intuitively, Novy's measure captures the fact that if a country's trade costs vis-à-vis its trading partners fall, then a part of its production that was previously consumed domestically will instead be shipped overseas. Trade costs are thus closely related to the extent to which a country trades with itself rather than other countries, and data on this kind of relative openness can be used to track the level of trade costs and their variation over time. Importantly, this measure of trade costs is "top down" rather than "bottom up". By this we mean that it infers the ratio of inter-to intranational trade costs based on observed patterns of production and trade around the world, rather than building up an estimate of trade costs based on data covering particular types of impediments 3 In fact, Novy (2011) shows that basically the same measure can be derived from a wide variety of theoretical models of international trade, including Chaney (2008) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) . The interpretation of some parameters changes depending on the model used, but the overall approach remains very similar. Novy's approach builds on Head and Ries (2001). to trade. It thus takes account of all factors that influence trade costs, and is not subject to the kind of omitted variables bias that calls into question the results of previous attempts to measure trade costs in services by analyzing the results of gravity model estimates (e.g., Walsh, 2006) . 4 In Section 4, we report results for sales of foreign affiliates based on a small sample of countries for which data are available. We also indicate how bilateral "Mode 3 trade costs" could be calculated with an approach similar to Novy (2011) . 5 We have both gross output and exports at the industry level in this set of I-O tables, the two variables needed to calculate domestic trade.
6 See Spinelli and Miroudot (2015) for detailed information on the creation of these services trade statistics. 
Services commitments in 66 regional trade agreements
To assess the impact of RTAs on trade costs, we use a database developed at the OECD that covers all services agreements where an OECD economy, China, or India is a party (Miroudot et al., 2010) . This accounts for 66 of the 88 agreements notified to WTO under GATS Art. V (as of August 2011). 7 The database reports market access and national treatment commitments in the 155 sub-sectors of the GATS Services Sectoral Classification List. Horizontal restrictions -those that apply to all subsectors -are also taken into account and reported on all subsectors. The information is provided for each signatory of the RTA by mode of supply. 7 The full list of RTAs included is given in Annex 1. Commitments are either "full" (no limitation), "partial" (some limitations listed), or "unbound"
(no commitment). In addition, "partial" commitments are broken down into nine different types of trade restrictive measures, four for market access and five for national treatment. This classification of non-conforming measures is detailed in Table 1 . The database includes similar analysis for commitments in GATS and can be used to assess to what extent RTAs are WTO-plus and provide for additional commitments.
As this database is of a qualitative nature, we compute indices that capture the extent to which services RTAs are preferential as compared to the GATS. The methodology is the following. An initial score of 100 is assigned to each agreement, country, subsector, and mode of supply regardless of its degree of commitment (including the GATS). Then, depending on whether the subsector is "full", "unbound", or subject to some restrictions ("partial"), some points are deducted from this amount. The precise number of points granted to each restriction relies on a few assumptions:
• Market access matters relatively more than national treatment.
• Unbound is worse than partial, which is in turn worse than full.
• Quantitative restrictions such as quotas or licensing requirements are more trade-restrictive than discrimination on subsidies or prohibitions on partnerships for instance.
There is some inherent subjectivity in ranking and weighting the importance of trade restrictive measures and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss how it can be done. Table 2 summarizes our own subjective assessment and details the scores for each mode of supply (the points that are lost out of a total of 100 when the sub-sector is unbound or partial). We note that no commitment at all (unbound) does not give a score of zero for a given sub-sector and mode of supply but 20 (out of 100). "Unbound" means that there is no commitment in the RTA to provide market access and national treatment, but this should not be understood as trade being banned. It could be the case that no restrictive measure is actually in place in the country. Since we work with data on cross-border trade in services, we assign Mode 1 a much larger weight (70%) than is the case for the other modes (10% for each). Yet, we choose not to give a zeroweight to Modes 3 and 4 to account for the potential complementarities that may exist between modes of supply. Mode 2 is also part of cross-border trade but is economically less important and rather difficult to restrict. We are now left with a score ranging between 0 and 100 for each agreement/country/subsector. The next step is then to compute for each RTA the difference between the agreement's score and the GATS score. This difference therefore takes on values from -100 to 100. Because an agreement that is worse than GATS (i.e., a GATS minus) is de facto ineffective, we replace all negative values by zeros, which means no preferential treatment at all. Hence, the higher the value of the index, the more preferential the RTA for a given country/subsector. 3 sectors do not match one-to-one, we averaged the RTA index when needed using equal weights.
Eventually, we get an index of the preferential content of RTAs for each party to an agreement that is compatible with our trade costs data at the sector level.
3 Trade costs and regional trade agreements To further assess to what extent Figure 2 reflects the composition of the group of countries having signed an RTA or the evolution of trade costs within these RTAs, Figure 3 gives an average bilateral trade cost before and after the entry into force of the RTA. We set to t = 0 the year of entry into force of each agreement and we report the average trade costs (over all the RTAs) up to five years before and after this date. As trade costs are to some extent cyclical and vary over time, pulling different years together introduces some volatility but the results suggest that both in the case of goods and services, RTAs contribute to a decrease in trade costs. Of course, these descriptive data do not say anything about causality but they suggest that Figure 2 captures more of a composition effect.
Lastly, we present in Figure 4 results for the European Union. We have separately calculated average bilateral trade costs among EU Members and in EU RTAs (i.e. between EU Members and countries with which the EU has signed an RTA). We have also included in the The surprise in Figure 4 is that after 2002, we measure higher trade costs among EU countries than in the RTAs signed by the EU or in other non-EU RTAs, alhtough there is some convergence towards the end of the sample period. We investigate in more detail in the next section what could drive these results, but Figure 4 is not at odds with the gravity literature that finds that an EU dummy variable generally has a negative sign (indicating that EU countries trade a lower volume of services than predicted by the gravity model). Whether or not one believes the data, there is the question of why services RTAs are not clearly associated with lower levels of trade costs. 
Can we trust the data?
Anybody working in the area of services trade knows that cross-border trade statistics at a disaggregated level (by partner country and/or by industry) are problematic. To begin with, the coverage of balance of payments trade data is not comprehensive. While total trade in services is generally available for most economies, trade by partner country or by industry is missing for a significant number of reporters. In addition, for countries that do provide the disaggregated data, there is still a large share of unallocated trade (Miroudot and Lanz, 2008; Spinelli and Miroudot, 2015) . Unfortunately, data on sales of foreign affiliates (Foreign Affiliates Trade Statistics) are even less available than cross-border trade in services data. We can however apply a methodology similar to the one we apply to cross-border trade to measure the bilateral "investment costs" or more exactly the cost of selling through a foreign affiliate, the foreign affiliate sales (FAS) cost. Building on Head and Ries (2008) , Gormsen (2011) has developed a measure of the cost of barriers to FDI.
We can apply a similar methodology to sales of foreign affiliates, as the formula is at the end a derivation of the gravity equation and the gravity equation applies to FAS as well (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007 and Kleinert and Toubal, 2010) .
We calculate the bilateral FAS cost as 9 : τ i j =
Sales i j .Sales ji Sales ii Sales j j
8 For example, in the case of construction services, balance of payments data cover to some extent short-term contracts where there is commercial presence in the sense of GATS but no establishment (the foreign company operates in the territory of the partner country on the basis of a local office and remains a non-resident entity whose revenues are regarded as an international transaction recorded in the balance of payments). Construction services data sometimes include the cost of construction materials which are goods, another issue to measure accurately the services trade involved. 9 We do not discuss extensively the methodology as this is not the purpose of this paper to measure FAS costs. We can thus nuance the picture regarding the impact of RTAs. In the case of the EU, there seems to be an impact on the cost of providing services through Mode 3. But we have insufficient data to check whether this is specific to the EU and the deep integration achieved through the Single Market or whether a similar trend would be observed in all RTAs that cover Mode 3 or have a substantive investment chapter.
4.2 Services reforms: do they benefit domestic and foreign producers in a similar way?
In our analysis, we define trade costs as the additional costs faced by foreign suppliers as opposed to domestic producers. Equation 1 relates "domestic trade costs" to international trade costs. Because the measure is relative, a reform that would have the same (or a proportional) impact on domestic and foreign suppliers would not affect trade costs estimates. Another way of interpreting Figure 2 would then be that any services trade liberalisation (resulting or not from the signature of a RTA)
lowers trade costs for all suppliers so that the ratio between foreign and domestic costs is not altered.
This would be the case first if RTAs had no impact on the actual trade regime. Schedules of commitments in services are legal bindings. Countries take market access and national treatment commitments but often these commitments just reflect the current state of regulations. Already at the multilateral level, the literature points out that countries have locked-in their current regime and not used GATS to liberalize trade (Hoekman, 1996; Adlung and Roy, 2005) . Then, another assumption is that when they do change the trade regime, RTAs have no impact on measures that discriminate against foreign suppliers. The concept of preferences is not easy to tackle in the context of services trade (Sauvé and Mattoo, 2011; Sauvé and Shingal, 2011) .
Some measures are not really prone to discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers.
For example, market regulations introducing rules on prices, access to networks or increasing the powers of a competition authority will equally benefit domestic and foreign services suppliers. It is not possible to create a market more competitive for domestic suppliers only or foreign suppliers would have to be totally excluded from this market. Then, there are measures such as licenses or taxes where it would be technically feasible to introduce discrimination between domestic and foreign producers but where in practice this is not the case. In the end, discriminatory measures are limited to foreign equity restrictions, labour market tests for the entry of natural persons, and the recognition of qualifications. But even in these areas, not all countries introduce discriminatory measures.
The trend in services reforms is also to increase competition, including by allowing foreign producers to enter the domestic market and compete. Countries that have reformed their telecoms or energy sectors, for example, have generally encouraged the entry of foreign firms to increase productivity and lower prices for consumers. In the presence of an incumbent firm previously benefiting from a domestic monopoly, foreign competition is important for the market to become competitive. Services reforms are generally not of a discriminatory nature and this gives less opportunities for negotiatiors of RTAs to offer genuine preferences to partner countries.
Is services trade liberalisation de facto MFN?
For the same reasons stated above, there is no clear evidence that discrimination among foreign producers is the objective or outcome of services RTAs. Unlike tariffs in the case of goods, there is no easy way to grant preferences for services providers of specific countries. Market access barriers or barriers to competition generally apply the same way to all foreign suppliers. In the case of the recognition of qualifications or visa policies, some advantage may be given to a priviledged partner country. For example, a mutual recognition agreement can be signed or a quota can be granted to temporary services providers of a given nationality. But in practice, there are very few instances where countries do discriminate.
Once again, one should keep in mind that services are generally regulated in domestic laws that are designed for domestic purposes by the ministries in charge of specific services sectors. Such laws are not used for commercial diplomacy and do not include legal instruments giving opportunities to trade negotiators to grant actual preferences to specific countries. This is why services RTAs are most of the time about "preferential bindings" rather than actual preferences.
Another reason is that rules of origin for services are quite liberal in the case of legal persons (Fink and Nikomborirak, 2007; Miroudot et al., 2010) . GATS Article V:6 requires that foreign services suppliers established in a country and engaged in "susbtantive business operations" benefit from the treatment granted in RTAs signed by that country. For example, EU companies established in the US can benefit from NAFTA provisions and have the same treatment as US companies exporting services to Mexico or Canada. The "substantive business operations" criterion is generally not subject to specific tests or requirements. 10 This could explain why countries are not willing to introduce discriminatory barriers to cross-border trade in services. Such barriers could be circumvented by the establishment of companies in countries that would have the most preferential treatment.
This being said, we observe in our dataset differences in trade costs according to the partner country. 
